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Abstract 
According to Hannah Arendt, action and inter-communication are the essence of the authority process. The authority is the main 
factor that assures the sense of public space, a potential space where people belong to, and where they can interact and 
communicate. Although there are no established solutions that can be used when a crises appears because crises are very different 
by pattern there are some situations when atypical measures can modify the disadvantageous context. Our paper aims to analyze 
both communication and action strategies that were practiced during the two suspension campaign of the Romanian President, 
Traian Băsescu. The second suspension context placed the president in a disadvantageous relation with the electors so that the 
political battle was considered at the beginning lost. However, the communication strategies used during political crises can 
modify the elector's attitudes towards a specific subject or politician. So, our paper analyses the communication and action 
strategies in order to establish their efficiency and the way that Romanian electors perceive and react. The periods of political 
crises are a good opportunity for politicians in order to perform their discursive abilities, to gamble their action strategies and to 
confirm their public imagine. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Giovani Sartori mistaken beliefs about democracy make it function incorrectly, and what 
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democracy is cannot be separated from what it should be. If we accept the premise that the a political system’s 
complexity increases with the number of actors involved in making decisions at the general level of society, than we 
observe that it becomes necessary to redefine the term, even more so since we are considering the political reality in 
current Romania. Recent political events, Teodor Dima believes, reveal a Romania without the original intellectual 
ideas of the democratic system, internal coherence, the set of principles and founding ideas. Thus, we have the 
impossibility of defining the current political system and we do not know what we can do with Romanian 
democracy. Political communication needs to be analyzed as a democratic practice, as a fundamental indicator for 
the state of a democracy. Democracy is the standard against which we can evaluate evolution in the sphere of 
political communication. The 2007 and 2012 recall campaigns for Romanian President Traian Băsescu were not 
seen as a democratic exercise, but rather as proof of a lack of maturity for the political class and Romanian 
democracy.  Our paper aims to analyze the way the president’s recall referendum was managed in 2012 from the 
perspective of communication and actions taken. Having found himself in that position for the second time, the 
president used a series of strategies and communication techniques in order to attract the hostile electorate.  
From the perspective Blumer and Gurevitch [1] analyzing political communication requires a systematic 
approach, the result of diverse social and communicational logics intersecting in the context of the interaction 
between the political class, the media, citizens, influence groups and opinion leaders. Any attitude, gesture, action 
that can affect the image, with negative effects on the credibility of the message, public profile, is an image crisis. 
The image crisis has as a primary effect affecting credibility. Notoriety constructed on image misconstructions, from 
uninspired statements to mistaken decisions, leads unavoidably to the emergence of an image crisis.  
 
2. Analytic methodology 
 
 According to Camelia Beciu [2] the way in which citizens gain certain expectations of the political act is 
essential for the vitality of a democracy. Political communication is, from this point of view, a resource for the 
citizen who needs to form, through information and debate, the options that can be made in the realm of the 
political. In politics we depart from the idea that the press is set on tarnishing the image, that it acts on command and 
the attitude is generally offensive and accusatory. Usually, communication therefore becomes non-communication. 
The spin-doctor techniques are used to point out the various strategies addressing circumstances unfavourable to the 
politician, of a nature, which could affect political careers. The conjecture within which political communication 
takes place today influences the perception that the voting public has of political figures. These are used to turn the 
situation to the advantage of the politician, even if it means employing false information, bending the truth or the 
creation of artificial context only in order to increase the positive visibility of the political figure. Politicians often 
use these types of techniques in order to resolve a political mishap, to control complicated circumstances as much as 
possible, of taking political responsibility or announcing an unpopular measure.  
 From the perspective of W. L. Benoit [3], the image rehabilitation proposed depart from two premises: 
communication is an activity aimed at purposes that are not always compatible and the main goal of communication 
is maintaining good reputation with the public. The author classifies the image rehabilitation strategies in two main 
categories: 
 Responsibility avoidance strategies consisting in reducing the responsibility of people for the acts they are 
accused of. The strategy may take different forms: provocation (the action was a response to another mistaken or 
malicious action of another person or institution), justification (the person had not had sufficient information on the 
subject and cannot be held entirely responsible), accidental character, good intentions.  
 Danger reduction strategies for the act through which, without avoiding the issue of responsibility, attention is 
drawn to the fact that the alleged action are not nearly as damaging as they appear to be. Six pathways are identified 
in this case: obtaining support (attempting to provoke positive feelings within the public towards the accused, 
through highlighting qualities or past positive actions), reducing negative sentiment (claiming that the alleged action 
is not all that damaging and the accused is not as guilty as it appears in order to reduce dissatisfaction among the 
public), differentiation (the action are less damaging than other actions of the same type that have had more 
damaging effects), attacking the attacker (attackers are accused in order to highlight the weakness of their position in 
order to create the impression that the person is, in fact, the victim of a smear campaign), humility (the person 
acknowledges guilt and publicly asks for forgiveness). Our case study will analyse the main themes circulated 
during the electoral campaign as well as the strategies employed to rehabilitate the image of a candidate during a 
political image crisis.  
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3. Context 
 
 On July 16 2012, 256 parliamentarians suspended President Traian Băsescu, for the second time after the 
suspension in 2007 when 322 parliamentarians voted against him. After a wave of unpopular measures claimed by 
him, ample protest in the beginning of 2012, the second suspension, compared to his direct opponents saw the first 
action of this type as successful.  If during the first suspension the President had a large part of the electorate on his 
side, this time the challenge was a comeback with a hostile population to whom he had lost popularity. That is why 
the president himself mentioned that it seemed like an impossible mission to win the referendum.  
  
What can you do in an electoral campaign in which everything seems lost? What strategies do you adopt to 
convince when the greatest adversary is yourself? The only option left is to play the card of the impossible. In fact, 
all the political confrontations of Traian Băsescu started with a second chance. In 2004 his surprise candidacy, 
following the withdrawal of Theodor Stolojan, against Adrian Năstase, in 2007 when he was suspended and placed 
in a difficult previously unknown situation for Romanian politics, in 2009 for the second presidential mandate when 
he faced an enormous political alliance ranged against him, and in 2012 with the second suspension everything 
seemed lost. All of these challenges faced by Traian Băsescu were overcome in one way or another. Political crisis 
situations they were faced with emphasised his abilities and the capacity to transform the impossible into the 
possible. Thus, after two years during which his credibility dropped significantly among voters due to the financial 
crisis and the adopted measures, his only chance was to play the card of the politician who has nothing left to loose. 
Nevertheless, his mission was nearly impossible since this referendum was aimed at him specifically and sent him to 
be judged by a people wanting to punish him for the way it had been governed. In this context, the issue was raised 
of how to change the agenda of a referendum aimed directly at him and in which the majority was clearly against 
him, in such a way as to shift inconvenient subjects. The solution identified was to introduce new debate subjects 
during the campaign, which would distract attention away from freely admitted mistakes. Therefore the electoral 
campaign included, other than the fight with direct opponents, the idea of a coup, contesting the suspension 
judicially by European officials and the referendum procedures themselves. All this occupied a large part of the 
public debate space, along with the daily interventions of the suspended president in the mass media.  
 
4. Data analysis 
 
 The electoral campaign was constructed on the duality between antithetic values: “honour” and “dishonour” 
which resurfaced constantly during the president’s interventions. In his first speech after being suspended the 
president used the word “honour” four times and the word “dishonour” eight times. Choosing these two values splits 
the argument axis in order to reveal two distinct worlds, two distinct Romanians: the opposition on the one hand and 
Traian Băsescu on the other, Romania and the European Union, politicians and Romanian citizens. Departing from 
the premise that he is not defending his position, but an European Romania, which he had built together with 
Romanians in the past 8 years, the president moved the accent from his person to the destiny and evolution of his 
country. The referendum became a referendum on Romania and the country’s political situation internally and 
externally from a starting point where the focus was on the president’s activity and the way the public evaluated it. 
This shift in direction was meant to draw the public to his side: “Romanians will not take part in a dishonourable 
thing,” “Romanians will not take part in this way of doing politics,” “Romanians will not accept this type of play.” 
The disappointed electorate would not back a president in difficulty but instead it would support the country during 
a period of political upheaval. Our study analyses the suspension campaign from two points of view: communication 
and action. From the point of view of communication we will monitor the messages sent throughout the campaign 
with the aim of identifying strategies employed throughout the crisis. Regarding actions we will inventory the 
measures adopted in order to correlate them with the communication component.  
 
 The first level, that of communication, was intensely used by the suspended president, as this was the most active 
campaign, with the most press conferences from the campaign headquarters, press statements and public 
interventions. Nearly daily Traian Băsescu established themes and communication messages aimed to take over the 
media agenda and often introducing new debate themes in the public space. Between the two available options of 
communicating everything and communicating nothing, the first was chosen with the purpose of diversifying debate 
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themes and changing the main subject. If during the first suspension campaign there was interplay between a 
president having the approval of the public and his political adversaries, during the second campaign it was Traian 
Băsescu against everyone. Returning to the people was no longer in his favour, and therefore new themes were 
necessary for sensitizing the public. Thus new themes were introduced, such as: plagiarism, the government’s 
inability to organize the referendum according to clear rules, the precise number of voters in Romania, Crin 
Antonescu’s lack of experience as intermediary president, the coup, the fragile relationship with the European Union 
and the political and economic instability, the decrease in credibility of the state institutions (constitutional court, 
parliament, government and internal ministry).  
 
All these were intensely present in the media and were meant to remove the focus from the main character of the 
campaign, Traian Băsescu. Among the techniques used we recognise all: the personal attack of Ponta, Antonescu, 
Voiculescu, Iliescu and Năstase (Crin Antonescu and Victor Ponta are still anchored in the governing mode of the 
Iliescu – Năstase period, when they functioned as party state, Mister Ponta move dishonour all the way to Brussels), 
controversy (diversifying themes throughout the campaign), the multitude of press conferences, the accent on 
national symbols to support communicated messages (I am not defending my interests, my chair, I am defending 
Romania, a Romania that has taken many steps forward), the attacks launched constantly on the press representing 
the political interests of his adversaries.  
  
In the first part of the campaign we can the two components, communication and action. The president uses 
communication strategies and attempts to obtain the support of a hostile electorate, driving them to action and 
support. We can find combined strategies for evading responsibility and reducing the danger in the communicated 
messages. “It is not honourable to put a president in this position when he has been elected twice and after eight 
mandate years and three years of economic crisis, to ask that he obtain 51% of the votes, and yet I am convinced that 
Romanians will not in this way of making politics and what I have asked and am asking of those that support me is 
victory in the referendum.” The message of the president departs from penance, justification, reducing the negative 
sentiment in order to obtain support. His positive experience in the relationship with the electorate is also invoked 
(he was elected twice, eight mandated years) in order to introduce the differentiation (the economic crisis is the true 
cause of the change of the president-electorate relationship).  
 
This game of assuming responsibility (the president elect cannot be mute, he has the obligation to also claim 
responsibility during difficult times, I have always regretted that moment, I did it with a clenched heart, but I 
couldn’t not do it, it would have been cowardice and I am not the president of Romania to be a coward; Romanians 
have enough reasons to be upset with me) while declaring innocence (my conscience is at peace since I managed to 
take the country past the maximum risk, which is why I than Romanians again for bearing those measures and I 
assure them that there I had no other option and I did not do it for pleasure’s sake) was meant to confuse the public 
and sensitizing.  
 
Upon analysing the themes communicated throughout the referendum, we can observe that the main objective of the 
campaign was reached: new themes were introduced on the media’s agenda in order to capture attention, which was 
highlighted by the low percentages, only 8% regarded the president’s activity. In turn, a series of new themes 
captured the public space: the idea of a coup 23%, the organization of the referendum by the government 17%, 
attacking various political adversaries 18%. All these moved the focus of interest towards new characters who 
became visible: the premier, the intermediary president, the internal affairs minister, the Constitutional Court 
representatives and European officials.  
931 Cristina Cirtita-Buzoianu and Corina Daba-Buzoianu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  143 ( 2014 )  927 – 931 
 
Figure1 Themes communicated by the Romanian President during the second suspension campaign 
 
 The second part of the campaign changed direction, moving from action to inaction. After the communication 
employed most rehabilitation strategies and techniques, there was a new registry: the president asked his supporters 
not to come to the vote, not to validate the position of the opposition. The communication included messages 
arguing that his suspension was being contested by European leaders and seen as a coup and not a democratic act, 
and Romania’s credibility and image were gravely affected. We must do all that we can to invalidate the referendum 
so that the coup not be backed by a popular vote. Why should I ask my supporters to go to the vote? I cannot make 
these people go vote. Thus, beyond the public section that supported him, the president also drew to his part those in 
the electorate who did not generally vote during elections and who can contribute to invalidating the referendum. 
Essentially, the suspension referendum was no longer driven by action (how we should win) but by inaction (how 
not to lose), bringing a new element: you can win a campaign even if you lose the fight with the electorate.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Following the referendum where 46.24% of voters were present, 87.52% were for suspending the president and 
11.15% were against. Traian Băsescu remained president, managing to win the battle with the electorate due to the 
invalidation of the referendum by the constitutional court. This proves that during electoral campaigns in Romania 
the accent is not on policies or the candidate to be evaluated, but on the way in which themes are circulated through 
the media, particularly those with emotional impact and especially towards the end of the campaign. Nevertheless, 
communication strategies and the abilities of a candidate in establishing action are essential, particularly when the 
electorate is primarily oriented towards an emotional vote. In the political fight, in certain cases, communication and 
action can transform into non-communication and inaction for as long as they are efficient and can rehabilitate the 
image of a candidate.  
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